Temporal Belief Revision Rationalized by Plausibility Orderings by Giacomo Bonanno









Within the class of structures introduced in [G. Bonanno, Axiomatic
characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic,
Arti￿cial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 144-160] we consider the subclass sat-
isfying the property that, for every state-instant pair (!;t), there is an
ordering of the set of states that rationalizes the revised beliefs at every
(!;t
0) where t
0 is an immediate successor of t. We characterize this class
both semantically and syntactically.
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1 Introduction
In [2] we introduced semantic structures (called LAGM-frames) and a corre-
sponding temporal logic (called LAGM) for modeling iterated belief revision
over time and explored the relationship between that logic and the AGM pos-
tulates for one-stage belief revision introduced in [1]. It is well-known that the
AGM postulates can be associated with the existence of a plausibility ordering,
in the sense that the revised beliefs correspond to the most plausible formulas
compatible with the information received (see, for example, [6]). In this note we
consider the subclass of LAGM-frames where, for every state-instant pair (!;t),
there is a ￿plausibility￿ordering (total pre-order) of the set of states that ra-
tionalizes the revised beliefs at every (!;t0) where t0 is an immediate successor
of instant t. A frame in this class is called a plausibility frame. We provide a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for an LAGM-frame to be a plausibility frame
￿Parts of this paper were presented at the Workshop on Formal models of belief change in
rational agents, Dagstuhl, August 2007.
1and identify an extension of logic LAGM that characterizes the class of plau-
sibility frames. We also provide a simpler su¢ cient condition and identify the
corresponding logic. The results are proved by establishing a correspondence
between LAGM-frames and structures studied in the rational choice literature
(see [7], [9]).
2 Semantics
We consider the structures introduced in [2] consisting of branching-time frames
with the addition of a belief relation and an information relation for every
instant t. A next-time branching frame is a pair hT;￿i where T is a (possibly
in￿nite) set of instants or dates and ￿ is a binary ￿precedence￿relation on T
satisfying the following properties: 8t1;t2;t3 2 T; (1) uniqueness: if t1 ￿ t3 and
t2 ￿ t3 then t1 = t2, (2) acyclicity: if ht1;:::;tni is a sequence with ti ￿ ti+1,
for every i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, then tn 6= t1: The interpretation of t1 ￿ t2 is that
t2 is an immediate successor of t1 or t1 is the immediate predecessor of t2:
every instant has at most a unique immediate predecessor but can have several
immediate successors.
A temporal belief revision frame is a quintuple hT;￿;￿;fBtgt2T;fItgt2Ti
where hT;￿i is a next-time branching frame, ￿ is a (possibly in￿nite) set of
states (or possible worlds) and, for every t 2 T, Bt and It are binary relations
on ￿. The interpretation of !It!0 is that at state ! and time t, according to
the information received, it is possible that the true state is !0. On the other
hand, the interpretation of !Bt!0 is that at state ! and time t, in light of the
information received, the individual considers state !0 possible (an alternative
expression is ￿!0 is a doxastic alternative to ! at time t￿ ). We shall use the
following notation:
Bt(!) = f!0 2 ￿ : !Bt!0g and, similarly, It(!) = f!0 2 ￿ : !It!0g:
Thus Bt(!) is the set of states that are reachable from ! according to the relation
Bt and similarly for It(!).
De￿nition 1 An LAGM-frame is a temporal belief revision frame that satis￿es
the following properties: 8! 2 ￿; 8t;t1;t2 2 T,
(0) if t ￿ t1 and Bt(!) \ It1(!) 6= ? then Bt1(!) = Bt(!) \ It1(!),
(1) Bt(!) ￿ It(!),
(2) if It(!) 6= ? then Bt(!) 6= ?,
(3) if t ￿ t1, t ￿ t2, It2(!) ￿ It1(!) and It2(!) \ Bt1(!) 6= ? then
Bt2(!) = It2(!) \ Bt1(!).
Property 0 was called the Qualitative Bayes Rule in [2]; Property 1 cor-
responds to the requirement that information be believed, while Property 2
2requires beliefs to be consistent if the information received is consistent. Prop-
erty 3 was referred to as CAB in [2] and corresponds to postulates (K*7) and
(K*8) of the AGM theory of belief revision [1].
We are interested in the subclass of LAGM-frames satisfying the property
that, at every state-instant pair, belief revision can be rationalized by a ￿plau-
sibility￿ordering of the set of states, in the sense that the states that the agent
considers possible are the most plausible among the ones that are compatible
with the information received.
De￿nition 2 A plausibility ordering of the set of states is a binary relation
R ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ which is re￿exive (8! 2 ￿, (!;!) 2 R), connected (8!;!0 2 ￿ with
! 6= !0, either (!;!0) 2 R or (!0;!) 2 R) and transitive (8!;!0;!00 2 ￿, if
f(!;!0);(!0;!00)g ￿ R then (!;!00) 2 R). Given a plausibility ordering of ￿
and a subset E ￿ ￿, let
bestR E = f! 2 E : (!;!0) 2 R;8!0 2 Eg:
De￿nition 3 A plausibility frame is an LAGM-frame that satis￿es the following
property: 8! 2 ￿; 8t 2 T, there exists a plausibility ordering R!;t of ￿ such
that
for every t0 2 T such that t ￿ t0;Bt0(!) = bestR!;t It0(!):
Not every LAGM-frame is a plausibility frame, as the example illustrated in
Figure 1 shows. For simplicity, we have assumed that the information relations
It are equivalence relations (whose equivalence classes are denoted by rectangles)
and the belief relations Bt are serial, transitive and euclidean1 (we represent
this fact by enclosing states in ovals and, within an equivalence class of It,
we have that, for every two states ! and !0, !0 2 Bt(!) if and only if !0
belongs to an oval).2 For example, in the LAGM-frame of Figure 1 we have
that It1(￿) = f￿;￿;￿g, Bt1(￿) = f￿g, It2(￿) = f￿;￿;￿g, Bt2(￿) = f￿;￿g,
It3(￿) = f￿;￿;￿] and Bt3(￿) = f￿g:
Consider the state-instant pair (￿;t0) in Figure 1 and suppose that R is a
plausibility ordering of ￿ that rationalizes belief revision at (￿;t0). Then, con-
sidering (￿;t2), we have that bestR f￿;￿;￿g = f￿;￿g, so that f(￿;￿);(￿;￿)g ￿
R. Considering (￿;t1), we have that bestR f￿;￿;￿g = f￿g, so that (￿;￿) 2 R.
Thus f(￿;￿);(￿;￿);(￿;￿)g ￿ R, implying that ￿ 2 bestR f￿;￿;￿g, but this
contradicts what is the case at (￿;t3), namely that bestR f￿;￿;￿g = f￿g.
1Bt is serial if, 8! 2 ￿, Bt(!) 6= ?; it is transitive if !0 2 Bt(!) implies that Bt(!0) ￿ Bt(!);
it is euclidean if !0 2 Bt(!) implies that Bt(!) ￿ Bt(!0).
2Note, however, that the results below do not require It to be an equivalence relation, nor
do they require Bt to be serial, transitive and euclidean.
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The proofs of all the propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Let F = hT;￿;￿;fBtgt2T;fItgt2Ti be an LAGM-frame. Then
F is a plausibility frame if and only if it satis￿es the following property: 8! 2 ￿,
8t;t1;:::;tn 2 T with t ￿ tk for all k = 1;:::;n,
if Itk(!) \ Btk+1(!) 6= ?, 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1; and Itn(!) \ Bt1(!) 6= ?
then Itk(!) \ Btk+1(!) = Btk(!) \ Itk+1(!), 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1.
(PLS)
For example, in the LAGM-frame of Figure 1 we have that It1(￿)\Bt2(￿) =
f￿g 6= ?, It2(￿) \ Bt3(￿) = f￿g 6= ? and It3(￿) \ Bt1(￿) = f￿g 6= ?, so that
the antecedent of PLS is satis￿ed. However, the consequent is violated since
It2(￿) \ Bt3(￿) = f￿g which is di⁄erent from Bt2(￿) \ It3(￿) = f￿;￿g.
While the above proposition gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for ra-
tionalizability by plausibility orderings, the following proposition gives a simpler
su¢ cient condition which, however, is not necessary.
Proposition 5 Let F = hT;￿;￿;fBtgt2T;fItgt2Ti be an LAGM-frame. Then
F is a plausibility frame if it satis￿es the following property: 8! 2 ￿; 8t1;t2;t3 2
T;
if t1 ￿ t2 and t1 ￿ t3 then there exists a t4 2 T such that
t1 ￿ t4 and It4(!) = It2(!) [ It3(!): (Pun)
We now turn to a syntactic characterization of plausibility frames.
43 A temporal logic for plausibility
We brie￿ y review the logic proposed in [2]. It is a propositional language with
￿ve modal operators: the next-time operator ￿ and it inverse ￿￿1, the belief
operator B, the information operator I and the ￿all state￿ operator A. The
intended interpretation is as follows:
￿￿ : ￿at every next instant it will be the case that ￿￿
￿￿1￿ : ￿at every previous instant it was the case that ￿￿
B￿ : ￿the agent believes that ￿￿
I￿ : ￿the agent is informed that ￿￿
A￿ : ￿it is true at every state that ￿￿ .
Given a temporal belief revision frame hT;￿;￿;fBtgt2T;fItgt2Ti one ob-
tains a model based on it by adding a function V : S ! 2￿ (where S is the set
of atomic propositions and 2￿ denotes the set of subsets of ￿) that associates
with every atomic proposition q the set of states at which q is true. Given a
model, a state !, an instant t and a formula ￿, we write (!;t) j= ￿ to denote
that ￿ is true at state ! and time t. Let k￿k denote the truth set of ￿, that is,
k￿k = f(!;t) 2 ￿ ￿ T : (!;t) j= ￿g and let d￿et ￿ ￿ denote the set of states at
which ￿ is true at time t, that is, d￿et = f! 2 ￿ : (!;t) j= ￿g. Truth at (!;t)
is de￿ned as usual for :￿ and ￿ _  . For the modal formulas we have
(!;t) j= ￿￿ if and only if (!;t0) j= ￿ for every t0 such that t ￿ t0:
(!;t) j= ￿￿1￿ if and only if (!;t
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(!;t) j= B￿ if and only if Bt(!) ￿ d￿et
(!;t) j= I￿ if and only if It(!) = d￿et
(!;t) j= A￿ if and only if d￿et = ￿:
Note that, while the truth condition for the operator B is the standard one,
the truth condition for the operator I is non-standard: instead of simply requir-
ing that It(!) ￿ d￿et we require equality: It(!) = d￿et (for an explanation see
[2]).
A formula ￿ is valid in a model if k￿k = ￿ ￿ T, that is, if ￿ is true at every
state-instant pair (!;t). A formula ￿ is valid in a frame if it is valid in every
model based on it. A property of frames characterizes (or is characterized by)
an axiom if the axiom is valid in every frame that satis￿es the property and,
conversely, if the frame violates the property then there is a model based on
that frame and a state-instant pair at which the axiom is falsi￿ed.
De￿ne ￿￿ = : ￿ :￿, and ￿￿1￿ = : ￿￿1 :￿. The basic logic L0 has the
following axioms: (1) all tautologies, (2) axiom K for all the modal axioms,
(3) the temporal axioms: ￿ ! ￿￿￿1￿ and ￿ ! ￿￿1￿￿, (4) the backward-
uniqueness axiom: ￿￿1￿ ! ￿￿1￿, (5) S5 axioms for A: A￿ ! ￿ and :A￿ !
A:A￿, (6) the inclusion axiom for B: A￿ ! B￿ and (7) axioms to capture the
non-standard semantics for I: (I￿ ^ I ) ! A(￿ $  ) and A(￿ $  ) ! (I￿ $
I ). The rules of inference are Necessitation for all the modal operators except
I and Modus Ponens.
The logic LAGM is obtained by adding to L0 the following axioms, where ￿
5and   are restricted to be Boolean (that is, non-modal) formulas.3
I￿ ! B￿ (A)
(:B:￿ ^ B ) ! ￿(I￿ ! B ) (ND)
:B:(￿ ^ : ) ! ￿(I￿ ! :B ) (NA)
(I￿ ^ :A:￿) ! (B  ! :B: ) (WC)
￿(I(￿ ^  ) ^ B￿) ! ￿(I￿ ! B ((￿ ^  ) ! ￿)) (K7)
￿(I￿ ^ :B:(￿ ^  ) ^ B(  ! ￿)) ! ￿(I(￿ ^  ) ! B￿) (K8)
If ￿1;:::;￿m are formulas we denote by
V
j=1;:::;m
￿j the conjunction (￿1 ^:::^
￿m).
Proposition 6 Within the class of LAGM-frames property PLS is character-
ized by the following axiom, where ￿j and ￿j are Boolean formulas, for every
j = 1;:::;n,






























De￿ne LPLS to be the logic obtained by adding axiom K9 to logic LAGM. It
was proved in [2] that logic LAGM is sound with respect to the class of LAGM-
frames. That result was extended to a characterization result in [4]. Putting
together the latter result and Proposition 6 we get the following.
Proposition 7 Logic LPLS is characterized by the class of plausibility frames,
that is, all the theorems of LPLS are valid in every plausibility frame and, con-
versely, if a temporal belief revision frame is not a plausibility frame then there
is a model based on that frame and an axiom of LPLS that is falsi￿ed at some
state-instant pair in that model.
We conclude with a logic that corresponds to the class of LAGM-frames that
satisfy Property Pun (see Proposition 5).
Proposition 8 Property Pun of temporal belief revision frames is characterized
by the following axiom
￿I￿ ^ ￿I  ! ￿I(￿ _  ) (UN)
Let LUN be the logic obtained by adding axiom UN to logic LAGM: The
following proposition follows from Propositions 5, 7 and 8.
3For an explanation of these axioms and the restriction to Boolean formulas see [2].
6Proposition 9 (a) Logic LUN is characterized by the class of LAGM-frames
that satisfy property Pun,
(b) Logic LPLS is sound with respect to the class of LAGM-frames that satisfy
property Pun.
4 Concluding remarks
In general, in a plausibility frame the ordering R!;t that rationalizes belief re-
vision at state-instant pair (!;t) is di⁄erent from the ordering R!;t0 that ratio-
nalizes belief revision at (!;t0) with t ￿ t0. In the literature on iterated be-
lief revision several proposals have been made concerning the restrictions that
should be placed on how di⁄erent the new ordering can be from the earlier one:
see, for example, [5] and [8]. The analysis proposed in this paper allows one to
frame the discussion both semantically (with conditions such as property PLS)
and syntactically (in terms of axioms such as axiom K9).
Alternatively, one might be interested in the existence of an ordering that
rationalizes belief revision not at (some state ! and) all the immediate succes-
sors of an instant t but along a particular history, that is, along a sequence
h(!;t0);(!;t1);:::;(!;tn)i with ti ￿ ti+1 for all i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1.4 A partial
analysis along these lines is o⁄ered in [3] where it is shown that such an order-
ing exists whenever information gets re￿ned over time, in the sense that later
information implies earlier one.
A Appendix: proofs
In order to prove Propositions 4 and 5 we ￿rst consider structures h￿;E;fi
where ￿ is a non-empty set, E ￿ 2￿ (2￿ denotes the set of subsets of ￿) and
f : E ! 2￿ is a function that associates with every E 2 E a subset f(E) ￿ ￿.
De￿nition 10 h￿;E;fi is a choice structure if it satis￿es the following prop-
erties: 8E;F 2 E,
(1) f(E) ￿ E,
(2) if E 6= ? then f(E) 6= ?,
(3) if E ￿ F and f(F) \ E 6= ? then f(E) = f(F) \ E.
The following result is due to Hansson ([7], Theorem 7, p. 455).
Proposition 11 . Let h￿;E;fi be a choice structure. Then the following are
equivalent:
(a) there is an ordering R ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ such that, 8E 2 E, f(E) = bestR E,
(b) 8E1;:::;En 2 E, if En \ f(E1) 6= ? and Ek \ f(Ek+1) 6= ?; 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1;
then Ek \ f(Ek+1) = f(Ek) \ Ek+1; 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1:
4That is, given a history h = h(!;t0);:::;(!;tn)i there exists an ordering Rh ￿ ￿￿￿ such
that, for very i = 1;:::;n, Bti(!) = bestRh Iti(!).
7Proof of Proposition 4. First we show that with every state-instant pair
in an LAGM-frame we can associate a choice structure. Fix an LAGM-frame
and arbitrary !0 2 ￿ and t0 2 T. Let T0 = ft 2 T : t0 ￿ tg be the set of
immediate successors of t0. Construct the following choice structure h￿;E;fi:
E = fIt(!0) : t 2 T0g and, for every It(!0) 2 E, f (It(!0)) = Bt(!0). By
Property 1 of LAGM-frames (see De￿nition 1), f satis￿es Property 1 of choice
structures (see De￿nition 10), while Property 2 of LAGM-frames guarantees that
f satis￿es Property 2 of De￿nition 10. To see that Property 3 of De￿nition 10 is
also satis￿ed, ￿x arbitrary E;F 2 E and suppose that E ￿ F and f(F)\E 6= ?.
Then there exist t1;t2 2 T0 such that E = It2(!0) and F = It1(!0) (so that
f(E) = Bt2(!0) and f(F) = Bt1(!0)), It2(!0) ￿ It1(!0) and Bt1(!0)\It2(!0) 6=
?. Then, by Property 3 of LAGM-frame Bt2(!0) = Bt1(!0) \ It2(!0), that is,
f(E) = f(F) \ E. Next we show that for the choice structure so constructed
Property b of Proposition 11 is equivalent to Property PLS. Fix E1;:::;En 2 E,
such that En \ f(E1) 6= ? and Ek \ f(Ek+1) 6= ?; 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1. Then
there exist t1;:::;tn 2 T0 such that, for all k = 1;:::;n, Ek = Itk(!0) and thus
f(Ek) = Btk(!0). By Property PLS, Itk(!0)\Btk+1(!0) = Btk(!0)\Itk+1(!0),
8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, that is, Ek \ f(Ek+1) = f(Ek) \ Ek+1; 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1.
Conversely, ￿x t1;:::;tn 2 T0 and suppose that Itn(!0) \ Bt1(!0) 6= ? and,
for all k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, Itk(!0) \ Btk+1(!0) 6= ?. Letting Ek = Itk(!0) and
f(Ek) = Btk(!0); for all k = 1;:::;n, it follows from Property b of Proposition 11
that Ek\f(Ek+1) = f(Ek)\Ek+1; 8k = 1;:::;n￿1, that is, Itk(!0)\Btk+1(!0) =
Btk(!0)\Itk+1(!0), 8k = 1;:::;n￿1. Proposition 4 now follows from Proposition
11.
The following proposition is a corollary of a result due to Hansson ([7],
Theorem 4, p. 448).
Proposition 12 Let h￿;E;fi be a choice structure that satis￿es the following
property: if E;F 2 E, then (E [ F) 2 E. Then there is an ordering R ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
such that, 8E 2 E, f(E) = bestR E:
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix an LAGM-frame that satis￿es Property Pun.
Then the associated choice structure h￿;E;fi de￿ned in the proof of Proposition
4 satis￿es the property that if E;F 2 E, then (E [ F) 2 E. Thus Proposition 5
follows from Proposition 12.
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix an LAGM-frame that satis￿es property
PLS, an arbitrary model based on it, arbitrary Boolean formulas ￿1;:::;￿n
and ￿1;:::;￿n and arbitrary !0 2 ￿ and t0 2 T and suppose that










Then there exist t1;:::;tn 2 T such that t0 ￿ tj for all j = 1;:::;n and
(a) (!0;t1) j= I￿1^:B:￿n^B￿1 and






tj for all j = 1;:::;n,
(b) Btj(!0) \ Itj￿1(!0) 6= ? for all j = 2;:::;n,





tj for all j = 1;:::;n:
(3)
Fix an arbitrary t 2 T with t0 ￿ t and suppose that, for some j 2 f1;:::;ng,




t. Since ￿j is a Boolean formula, by








tj, so that It(!0) = Itj(!0). It
follows from this and property (3) of LAGM-frames (see De￿nition 1), that
Bt(!0) = Btj(!0). Thus without loss of generality we can take t = tj:
We need to show that if j 2 f2;:::;ng then (!0;tj) j= B(￿j￿1 ! ￿j￿1) and
if j 2 f1;:::;n ￿ 1g then (!0;tj) j= B(￿j+1 ! ￿j+1). By (b) and (c) of (3) and
property PLS (letting k = j ￿ 1) we have that
Itj￿1(!0) \ Btj(!0) = Btj￿1(!0) \ Itj(!0); 8j = 2;:::;n: (4)
It follows from (4) and (d) of (3) that if j 2 f2;:::;ng then (!0;tj) j= B(￿j￿1 ! ￿j￿1)
and if j 2 f1;:::;n ￿ 1g then (!0;t) j= B(￿j+1 ! ￿j+1).5
Conversely, ￿x an LAGM-frame that violates property PLS. Then there exist
!0 2 ￿, t0;t1;:::;tn 2 T with t0 ￿ tk, for all k = 1;:::;n, and a k￿ 2 f1;:::;n￿1g
such that
(a) Itk(!0) \ Btk+1(!0) 6= ?, 8k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1;
(b) Bt1(!0) \ Itn(!0) 6= ?;
(c) Itk￿(!0) \ Btk￿+1(!0) 6= Btk￿(!0) \ Itk￿+1(!0):
(5)
Let p1;:::;pn;q1;:::;qn; be atomic propositions and construct a model where, for
every k = 1;:::;n, kpkk = Itk(!0) ￿ T and kqkk = Btk(!0) ￿ T. Then, by (a)
and (b) of (5) (letting j = k + 1)
5Proof. Suppose ￿rst that j 2 f2;:::;ng. Fix an arbitrary ! 2 Btj(!0). If (!;tj) j=





















= Itj￿1(!0). Thus ! 2 Itj￿1(!0), so that ! 2 Itj￿1(!0) \ Btj(!0). By (4)






















that is, (!;tj) j= ￿j￿1 and, therefore, (!;tj) j= (￿j￿1 ! ￿j￿1): Thus, since ! 2 Btj(!0) was
chosen arbitrarily, (!0;tj) j= B(￿j￿1 ! ￿j￿1).
Next we consider the case where j = 1 and show that (!0;t1) j= B(￿2 ! ￿2). Fix an
arbitrary ! 2 Bt1(!0). If (!;t1) j= :￿2 then (!;t1) j= (￿2 ! ￿2). If (!;t1) j= ￿2 then
! 2 d￿2et1. Since ￿2 is a Boolean formula, by Proposition 5 in [2], d￿2et1 = d￿2et2 and by
(a) of (3) d￿2et2 = It2(!0). Thus ! 2 Bt1(!0)\It2(!0). By (4) Bt1(!0)\It2(!0) ￿ Bt2(!0)
and by (d) of (3), Bt2(!0) ￿ d￿2et2. Since ￿2 is a Boolean formula, by Proposition 5 in [2],
d￿2et2 = d￿2et1. Thus ! 2 d￿2et1, that is, (!;t1) j= ￿2 and, therefore, (!;t1) j= (￿2 ! ￿2):
Thus (!0;t1) j= B(￿2 ! ￿2).
The proof that if j 2 f2;:::;n ￿ 1g then (!0;tj) j= B(￿j+1 ! ￿j+1) is similar.










By (c) of (5), either
(A) there is an ￿ 2 Itk￿(!0) \ Btk￿+1(!0) such that ￿ = 2 Btk￿(!0) \ Itk￿+1(!0)
or
(B) there is a ￿ 2 Btk￿(!0) \ Itk￿+1(!0) such that ￿ = 2 Itk￿(!0) \ Btk￿+1(!0).
Consider Case A ￿rst. Since ￿ 2 Btk￿+1(!0) and, by property (1) of LAGM-
frames (see De￿nition 1), Btk￿+1(!0) ￿ Itk￿+1(!0), it must be that ￿ = 2 Btk￿(!0),
so that (￿;t) j= :qk￿, for every t 2 T: Since ￿ 2 Itk￿(!0), (￿;t) j= pk￿, for every
t 2 T: Thus (￿;t) j= :(pk￿ ! qk￿), for every t 2 T, in particular (￿;tk￿+1) j=
:(pk￿ ! qk￿). Since ￿ 2 Btk￿+1(!0), it follows that (!0;tk￿+1) j= :B(pk￿ !
qk￿), so that, since (!0;tk￿+1) j= Ipk￿+1; (!0;tk￿+1) j= :(Ipk￿+1 ! B(pk￿ !
qk￿)). It follows from this and the fact that t0 ￿ tk￿+1 that (!0;t0) j= : ￿
(Ipk￿+1 ! B(pk￿ ! qk￿)). This, together with (6) falsi￿es axiom K9 at (!0;t0).
Now consider Case B. Since ￿ 2 Btk￿(!0) and Btk￿(!0) ￿ Itk￿(!0), it must
be that ￿ = 2 Btk￿+1(!0), so that (￿;t) j= :qk￿+1, for every t 2 T: Since ￿ 2
Itk￿+1(!0), (￿;t) j= pk￿+1, for every t 2 T: Thus (￿;t) j= :(pk￿+1 ! qk￿+1),
for every t 2 T, in particular (￿;tk￿) j= :(pk￿+1 ! qk￿+1). Since ￿ 2 Btk￿(!0),
it follows that (!0;tk￿) j= :B(pk￿+1 ! qk￿+1), so that, since (!0;tk￿) j= Ipk￿;
(!0;tk￿) j= :(Ipk￿ ! B(pk￿+1 ! qk￿+1). It follows from this and the fact that
t0 ￿ tk￿ that (!0;t0) j= : ￿ (Ipk￿ ! B(pk￿+1 ! qk￿+1)). This, together with
(6) falsi￿es axiom K9 at (!0;t0).
Proof of Proposition 8. Assume Property Pun and suppose that (!;t1) j=
￿I￿^￿I . The there exist t2;t3 2 T such that t1 ￿ t2, t1 ￿ t3, It2(!) = d￿et2
and It3(!) = d et3. Then, by Pun, there exists a t4 2 T such that t1 ￿ t4
and It4(!) = It2(!) [ It3(!). Since   is Boolean, d et3 = d et2. Furthermore,
d￿ _  et2 = d￿et2[d et2. Thus It4(!) = d￿ _  et2 and, since (￿_ ) is Boolean,
d￿ _  et2 = d￿ _  et4 : Thus (!;t4) j= I(￿ _  ) so that (!;t1) j= ￿I(￿ _  ).
Conversely, suppose that the property is violated, that is, there exist t1;t2;t3 2
T and ! 2 ￿ such that t1 ￿ t2 and t1 ￿ t3 and, for every t 2 T if t1 ￿ t
then It(!) 6= It2(!) [ It3(!): Let p and q be sentence letters and construct a
model where kpk = It2(!) ￿ T and kqk = It3(!) ￿ T. Then (!;t2) j= Ip and
(!;t3) j= Iq so that (!;t1) j= ￿Ip^￿Iq. Fix an arbitrary t 2 T such that t1 ￿ t.
By hypothesis It(!) 6= It2(!)[It3(!), so that, since dp _ qet = It2(!)[It3(!),
(!;t) 2 I(p _ q). Thus (!;t1) j= ￿:I(p _ q), that is, (!;t1) j= :￿I(p _ q):
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